

1 Henrik Mosesi (SBN: 189672)  
2 **PILLAR LAW GROUP, APLC**  
3 150 S. Rodeo Drive, Suite 260  
4 Beverly Hills, CA 90212  
5 [phone]: (310) 999-1000  
6 henry@pillar.law  
7 *Attorneys for Plaintiff*

8 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
9 **FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**  
10 **SAN DIEGO**

11 MALIBU MEDIA, LLC,  
12 Plaintiff,  
13 vs.

14 KEVIN PETERSON,  
15 Defendant.

Case Number: 3:16-CV-00786-JLS-NLS

**PLAINTIFF'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF  
ITS MOTION TO DISMISS  
DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM**

16  
17 KEVIN PETERSON  
18 Counterclaimaint  
19 v.

20 MALIBU MEDIA, LLC  
21 Counterdefendant  
22

**PLAINTIFF’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO DISMISS**

**DEFENDANT’S COUNTERCLAIM**

**I. INTRODUCTION**

As set forth in Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss, Defendant’s Counterclaim for Declaratory Relief is redundant and unnecessary and therefore should be dismissed. Defendant provides no argument otherwise. Indeed, Defendant’s only argument for his counterclaim is so that he may receive attorney’s fees should Plaintiff dismiss its case. This is not a valid reason to assert an otherwise meaningless counterclaim. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2), Plaintiff cannot dismiss its case without Court approval, and upon such conditions this Court deems just, including, if appropriate an award of attorneys’ fees. Defendant’s counterclaim is unnecessary because the Federal Rules already provide Defendant with the necessary tools for his protection. For these reasons, as explained more fully below, the Court should dismiss Defendant’s counterclaim.

**II. ARGUMENT**

**A. Defendant’s Counterclaim is Redundant**

Defendant’s counterclaim is repetitious and unnecessary. Indeed, the “purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act is ‘to relieve potential defendants from the Damoclean threat of impending litigation which a harassing adversary might brandish, while initiating suit at his leisure -- or never.’” *Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc.*, 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted); *Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Gorkster, Ltd.*, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1225-26 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (“The Act was intended to afford relief to those victimized by “scarecrow” litigation (i.e., circumstances in which a potential plaintiff immobilizes others with the mere threat of litigation), by allowing district courts to declare the legal relations of affected parties” (parenthetical in original)). “Separately litigating [a] defense in a declaratory posture would not serve the purposes of declaratory relief [and would be contrary to the] strong interests of judicial economy in avoiding needless duplication....” *Id.* at 1226.

Since Plaintiff’s Complaint and Defendant’s Affirmative Defenses already frame and will resolve Defendant’s liability, the counterclaim is redundant and unnecessary, and should be

1 dismissed. “When a defendant counterclaims for ‘declaratory judgment of non-infringement[,  
 2 it] is no more than a restatement of Defendant's general denial of liability. This is not a pleading  
 3 that complies with [minimum pleading requirements].” *Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe*, No. 2:14-  
 4 cv-821, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13173, at \*3 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 4, 2015); “Defendant seeks no  
 5 relief in his counterclaim other than that which would have the opposite effect of the relief sought  
 6 in the Complaint. As such, his counterclaim is redundant and unnecessary.” *Malibu Media, LLC*  
 7 *v. Batz*, Civil Action No. 12-cv-01953-WYD-MEH, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84709, at \*10 (D.  
 8 Colo. May 17, 2013).

9 **B. Defendant Has Recourse Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure**

10 Defendant’s only argument for not dismissing his counterclaim is that Defendant “seeks  
 11 to prevent Malibu Media from seeking an ‘easy exit’” and his counterclaim serves that purpose.  
 12 *See* CM/ECF 22. However, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have built in safe guards to  
 13 ensure that once a case enters into litigation, there is no easy exit. A declaratory judgment adds  
 14 nothing to the safeguards already designed in the Federal Rules. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41,  
 15 Plaintiff may only voluntarily dismiss Defendant on its own “before the opposing party serves  
 16 either an answer or a motion for summary judgment.” *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a). By the rule’s  
 17 very nature, Plaintiff cannot “cut and run.” If that was Plaintiff’s actual desire, Plaintiff would  
 18 not have served Defendant in the first place. Here, Plaintiff is litigating because it believes it  
 19 will prevail on the merits.

20 Courts have followed this rationale. “The issue of copyright infringement will be  
 21 decided by this court regardless of the declaratory judgment claim unless the parties stipulate to  
 22 settlement, or the Recording Companies move to voluntarily withdraw their complaint and the  
 23 court so orders pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P. Therefore, Duty's claim for a  
 24 declaratory judgment is redundant and unnecessary, and the Recording Companies motion to  
 25 dismiss it is granted (doc. 21).” *Interscope Records v. Duty*, No. 05-CV-3744-PHX-FJM, 2006  
 26 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20214, at \*10-11 (D. Ariz. Apr. 14, 2006) (emphasis added). “If and when the  
 27 defendants prevail in these cases they are free to move for an award of attorney's fees under  
 28

1 Section 505. Until then, however, the question of whether they are entitled to attorney's fees will  
 2 not be ripe, and thus it is not a proper subject of a counterclaim. Should Plaintiff move to  
 3 withdraw its complaint at this stage, it would need an order from the Court, which may be  
 4 conditioned on paying Defendant his fees, or other relief." *Maverick Recording Co. v.*  
 5 *Chowdhury*, Civil Action No. CV-07cv200 (DGT), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63783, at \*3  
 6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2008) (emphasis added).

7 As stated in *Maverick*, because Defendant has filed an answer, Plaintiff's complaint  
 8 cannot be dismissed without an order from the Court, which may be conditioned upon paying  
 9 Defendant fees or other relief. *See also Flex Prods. v. Valley Slurry Seal Co.*, No. 09cv2220-  
 10 WQH-JMA, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60844, at \*12 (S.D. Cal. June 16, 2010) ("Rule 41 vests the  
 11 district court with discretion to dismiss an action at the plaintiff's instance upon such terms and  
 12 conditions as the court deems proper.") This is the exact relief Defendant seeks by filing a  
 13 counterclaim.

### 14 **III. CONCLUSION**

15 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court dismiss Defendant's  
 16 counterclaim.

17 Respectfully submitted,

18 PILLAR LAW GROUP, APLC

19 /s/ Henrik Mosesi

20 Henrik Mosesi (SBN: 189672)  
 21 PILLAR LAW GROUP, APLC  
 22 150 S. Rodeo Drive, Suite 260  
 23 Beverly Hills, CA 90212  
 24 [phone]: (310) 999-1000  
 25 henry@pillar.law  
 26 Attorneys for Plaintiff

### 27 **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

28 I hereby certify that on November 15, 2016, I electronically filed the foregoing document  
 with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF and that service was perfected on all counsel of record

1 and interested parties through this system.

2 By: /s/ Henrik Mosesi